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INTRODUCTION

ITHO UT the continuing performance of the aviation services of
the Federal Government, the commercial airlines of the United
States could not operate for a single day.
The people of the United States through their Federal Government
are very much engaged in the commercial aviation business. Not only
have air mail contracts been a principal and indispensable source of
revenue to private air carriers over the years since 1926, but the Federal Government has built, maintained, and operated with funds
appropriated from general revenues the network of beacons, radio
range stations, and other facilities which together make up the present
vast system of aeronautical aids known as the Federal Airways. The
Federal Government has provided directly the greater part of all funds
invested in the construction of civil airports and has developed and
maintained elaborate air weather forecasting services without which
the present scheduled operations of our great modern air liners would
not be possible. Most of the personnel required for air traffic control
at our principal airports as well as the thousands of persons employed
in the maintenance and operation of the Federal Airways and in the
aeronautical weather services of the Weather Bureau are on the
Federal payroll.
Up to the present time, no means has been devised whereby the
Government can reasonably expect to recover directly any part of the
amounts invested. Moreover, the current, steadily increasing costs to
the Federal Government for the maintenance and .operation of the
Federal Airways, the Air Weather services, and similar Federal expenses incurred in the interest of commercial aviation are paid entirely
from general tax revenues and no plan for recovering any part of
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such expenses from the private carriers benefitted has as yet received
really serious consideration in any quarter.
The principal reason for this state of affairs lies in the fact that,
with the exception of a few years during the recent war, the earnings
of the principal commercial air carriers have not been sufficient to
support any repayments to the Government for the benefits described
above. Indeed, but for the direct air mail payments to individual
carriers, most, if not all of the principal carriers would have been
unable to remain in business.
In spite of the fact that the commercial aviation industry in the
United States is now generally regarded as "Big Business" within the
accepted meaning of that term, the ability of the industry to compete
profitably on equal terms with other forms of transportation has yet
to be demonstrated.
Generally speaking, as will be noted more specifically in subsequent
pages, the policy of Federal aid to aviation has been predicated on
the assumption that once the industry has achieved a certain size and
stability it will be able to sustain itself in more or less free competition
with other forms of transportation. In this respect the policy is similar
to that which has supported protective tariffs through the greater part
of our national history.
Although it appears that the average cost per seat mile has been
reduced somewhat through the use of larger aircraft, it is very doubtful
whether the cost per seat mile can be brought into a truly competitive
relationship with similar costs for other types of transportation.' It is
very clear, on the other hand, that the use of larger planes has been a
major factor in bringing about the present precarious situation in the
industry, because the current demand for air transportation is insufficient to permit profitable utilization. of the increased capacity.
Most current discussions of the earnings position of the certificated
air carriers take account only of the air mail subsidy, and the discussions
deal for the most part with need for higher mail pay and with the
question of how much of the mail pay represents subsidy. Other forms
of the subsidy to commercial aviation, which are considerably larger
in gross value than the air mail subsidy, and which are steadily increasing in amount, rarely figure in these discussions. There is some prospect that the air mail subsidy may ultimately be unnecessary and that
the certificated airlines as a group may become "profitable" in the
current usage of that term as applied to commercial aviation. However,
the prospect of their achieving an earning rate which would permit
them to reimburse the Government for their use of facilities and services now provided without charge, and thereby achieving a status of
true economic self-sufficiency, is quite another and much more difficult,
matter.
IPUFFER,
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It is worthy of note in this connection that in no other major nation
has air transportation been attempted on a competitive private enterprise basis. In nearly every other country the Government has buttressed its financial support of the industry with more or less direct
control over commercial aviation policies and there has been no
assumption that air transportation can or should become economically
self-sufficient in free competition with other transportation systems.
ATTITUDES TOWARD FEDERAL AID

The attitude of the Congress with respect to Federal aid to air
transportation has undergone a considerable metamorphosis since it
first passed legislation to authorize the carrying of air mail on a contract basis. The first Air Mail Act, generally known as the Kelly Act,
which became law on February 2, 1925, authorized the Postmaster
General to contract with private operators for the carrying of air mail,
provided that contract rates should not exceed 80 per cent of the postal
revenues derived from mail carried by aircraft. Congress clearly expected that the air mail service should pay for itself.
In the earliest hearings on air mail legislation, representatives of the
industry agreed with Government officials that there was no economic
2
or other justification for subsidizing the commercial aviation industry.
During the years from 1926 through 1934, when many efforts were
made to establish a basis on which commercial carriers could carry
mail without subsidy benefits, the principal objective was to achieve a
volume of air mail which it was believed would permit profitable
operations without subsidy aid.
Early in 1930 the Postmaster General is reported to have told the
air mail carriers that they were not entitled to a subsidy similar to that
paid to ocean shipping companies, because they were not competing
with foreign carriers. Moreover, he is said to have taken the position
that air mail payments should not be used to compensate for losses
incurred from passenger traffic.3
The Air Mail Act of 1934 specifically provided that air mail payments should not exceed air mail receipts after June 30, 1938. Although the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1.938 makes no provision for the
elimination of the subsidy, the Civil Aeronautics Board has proceeded
on the assumption that private air mail carriers will some day achieve
a basis of operation which will permit discontinuance of air mail subsidy payments.
The Board of Investigation and Research, in its report of September 18, 1944 to the Congress, specifically recommended that
2 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Commercial Aviation-Air Mail
Service, Hearing before Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, U.S. House of
Representatives, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 6, 1922 (Washington: Gov.
Print. Off. 1922).
3 DAVID, THE ECONOMICS OF AIR MAIL TRANSPORTATION

Brookings Institution, 1934), pp. 88-99.

(Washington:

The

JOURNAL

OF AIR LAW

AND COMMERCE

"public policies should be directed toward the objective of placing
domestic air transportation
on a self-sustaining basis as soon as
'4
that may be practicable."
The President's Air Policy Commission in its report of December
30, 1947 said:
We consider that direct Government financial aid to commercial
airlines is fully justified on grounds of national security and economic welfare. We believe the air transport system of this country
can, with such aid now, become self-supporting in the future. 5
It is the purpose of this study to trace the history and current trend
of Federal Aid to domestic commercial air transportation, to compute
estimates of the dollar value of the several forms of subsidy in recent
years, to appraise the industry's prospects for achieving economic selfsufficiency within the foreseeable future, and hence to arrive at some
judgment as to whether the Government should continue to base its
aviation policies upon the expectation that Federal aid will some day
be no longer necessary.
WHAT

Is

A SUBSIDY?

Although the first Air Mail Act expressly provided that payments
to carriers should not exceed four-fifths of the revenues derived from
air mail, and although both the Congress and the carriers had agreed,
on the record, at various times prior to 1934 that there was no valid
basis or justification for the subsidy of air mail operations, nevertheless
the trend of events moved inexorably in the direction of subsidy payments and with the exception of a few recent years, the carriers have
had since February 1, 1928, the benefit of air mail payments which
exceeded the air mail revenues.
It is clear that it would be improper to regard all of the air mail
payments made to carriers as a subsidy because such a basis of determination would disregard the legitimate costs of the airlines in providing air mail services. Moreover, since there has been no consistent
relationship between air mail postage rates and payments to the carriers, it is misleading to identify as a subsidy the excess of payments to
the carriers over postal revenues, although the air mail "deficit" has
been frequently used as a measure of the amount of the subsidy."
In the opinion of some experts the true measure of the air mail
subsidy is the excess of payments made to the carriers for the transportation of the air mail over that portion of the total operating costs of
the carriers which is allocable to the performance of that service. This
4 Board of Investigation and Research, Public Aids to Domestic Transportation, p. 4.
5 PRESIDENT'S AIR POLICY COMMISSION,

SURVIVAL IN

THE AIR AGE

(Washing-

ton: Gov. Print. Off. 1948), p. 102.
6 This is the measure applied by the Association of American Railroads in the
report on Air Transportationsubmitted by the Sub-Committee on Air Transportation of the Railroad Committee for the Study of Transportation in 1947.
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was the measure used by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation in
a study of public aids to scheduled air transportation covering the
fiscal years 1931-1938,7 and the same measure was used, with some
modifications in detail, by the Board of Investigation and Research
which undertook a similar study for the years 1939-1941.
The problem is not altogether solved, however, by the acceptance
of a definition such as that adopted by these investigators, because of
the difficulty of separating the portion of airline operating costs properly attributable to the transportation of air mail from those incurred
in connection with the passenger and other services provided.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has not as yet perfected a means for
differentiating such costs. In connection with its testimony before the
House Appropriations Committee, in February 1946, the Board submitted a statement concerning mail rates which said in part:
"No exact formula for allocating costs between the mail and
non-mail services has been developed. . . .As more information
becomes available for the measurement of traffic potentials in each
particular category and reliable estimates of traffic by categories
become feasible, it is contemplated that more specific procedure will
be developed for the allocation of costs to the different types of
traffic." 9
Under the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 the Civil
Aeronautics Board is authorized to establish rates of compensation to
air carriers for the transportation of mail on the basis of the cost of
providing such services plus the need of the carrier for such additional
revenue as may be necessary to enable him to continue in business. It
is apparent from the foregoing quotation that the distinction made by
the Board between "need" and "service" factors in any specific situation
must be, to a considerable degree, an arbitrary distinction.
An Accepted Formula for Identifying Air Mail Subsidy
In view of this situation, the formula used by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation and the Board of Investigation and Research
has been applied in this study to compute the amount and trend of
the subsidy in air mail payments for the fiscal years 1938 through 1948.
This formula provides first for the isolation of operating costs
which clearly are in no way attributable to carrying the mail. The
Board of Investigation and Research identified specifically the salaries
of the stewards and stewardesses, passenger supplies and expenses, traffic and advertising expenses, and the expense of consolidated airport
ticket office operations. 10
7 Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Public Aids to Transportation (Gov.
Print. Off. 1940), pp. 129ff.
8 Board of Investigation and Research, Public Aids to Domestic Transportation, p. 451.
9 Appropriation Bill for 1947, p. 896.
10 For the purpose of this paper the "Recurrent Report of Financial Data"
prepared by the Civil Aeronautics Board has been used. This is a quarterly sum-
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The second step in the formula used by the Board of Investigation
and Research was the pro-rationing of the net joint operating costs
remaining, between mail, passenger and other services on the basis
of the ratio of the ton-miles of each type of service to the total ton-miles
of revenue service performed. The net joint costs for the years 1938
through 1941 were thus computed by the Board of Investigation and
Research, and the same procedure was applied to the years 1942-1948
in the preparation of this study.
Finally, the formula takes account of capital charges on the basis of
a twelve per cent return on the invested capital, this rate having been
established at the time as sufficient to attract new capital into the
industry. The resulting charges for each year were apportioned on the
basis of the ratio of participation in total ton-miles of service performed
as described for step two. This phase of the formula has been applied
here in the same way and at the same rate.
The amount of the subsidy for each year is, of course, the difference
between the total sums paid to the air lines for carrying mail, and the
costs of the carriers attributable to the performance of this service
as computed by the formula. Although the Civil Aeronautics Board, as
indicated above, has not officially adopted a formula for ascertaining
the cost of carrying the air mail, the general method used by the Federal Co-ordinator and the Board of Investigation and Research has
been used by the Board in many air mail rate cases."
THE AMOUNT OF THE AIR MAIL SUBSIDY

The amount of the air mail subsidy as computed by the use of this
formula for each of the fiscal years 1938 through 1948 inclusive is
shown in Table I. Tables II and III present the detailed steps in the
application of the formula, arranged in such a way that the data in
each table is supported by data computed in the tables immediately
following.
An allocation of total traffic, on a ton mile basis, among the several
types of service offered provides the percentage used for computing
the portion of net joint costs allocable to the air mail service.' 2 In
Table III the allowance for a return on capital assets is computed.
The basis is the net depreciated value of the assets of the airlines. This
usage conforms closely to that of the earlier studies mentioned above.
mary of financial data filed with the Board by certificated carriers. These reports
include under "Operating Expenses" three items, which include no costs for mail
operations. These are "Passenger Service," "Traffic and Sales," and "Advertising
and Publicity." Officials of the Economics Bureau of the Civil Aeronautics Board
agreed informally with the selection of these items as being wholly free of any
mail costs.
11 Cf. Eastern Air Lines, Mail Rates, 3 CAB 733, 755 (1942); and Pennsylvania Central Airlines, Mail Rates, 4 CAB 22, 42 (1942).
12 Passenger miles were converted to ton miles for the purpose of this computation by allowing 200 pounds for each passenger including his allowable baggage
and adding thereto the ton miles of excess baggage carried. This is the same as
the basis used by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation and the Board of
Investigation and Research.
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TABLE I-COMPUTATION OF AIR MAIL SUBSIDY FOR FISCAL YEARS 1938-1948

Fiscal
Year
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
Total
Average

16 Domestic Trunk Carriers*
Costs
Allocable
Subsidy
to Mail (b)
Amount
per cent
$ 9,709,997
65.8
$ 5,037,948
5,164,172
11,944,077
70.0
4,994,965
14,475,670
74.3
6,031,937
14,248,241
70.3
6,998,188
16,814,252
70.6
10,052,544
12,467,103
55.3
14,951,940
13,079,243
46.7
20,633,702
14,910,363
42.0
18,069,349
9,338,084
34.1
13,355,891
10,611,526
44.3
15,969,246
21,708,844
57.6
$270,567,282
$121,259,882
$149,307,400
13,573,400
55.2
24,597,026
11,073,626

Total
Air Mail
Paymnents (a)
$ 14,747,945
17,108,249
19,470,635
20,280,178
23,812,440
22,519,647
28,031,183
35,544,065
27,407,433
23,967,417
37,678,090

Feeder Carriers
1946
$ 1,169,341
$
198,576
$
970,765
1947
3,805,989
216,929
3,589,060
1948
9,125,896
9,501,953
376,057
* Includes Territorial carriers up through fiscal year 1945. All data for
years 1938-1941 inclusive were taken directly from the Report of the Board of
Investigation and Research, House Document No. 159, 79th Congress, 1st Session,
Gov. Print. Off. 1945. Table 76, Page 452.
(a) Data for years 1942-1945 inclusive were taken from the Annual Report
of CAB, 1947, Gov. Print. Off. 1947, Appendix I, page 43. Data for 1946, 1947 and
1948 were supplied by Rates and Accounts Division of the CAB and take account
of retro-active mail revenues applicable under CAB rate orders and "show-cause"
orders issued through April 21, 1949.
(b) From Tables II and III.
TABLE II-COMPUTATION OF JOINT COSTS AND ALLOCATION OF JOINT COSTS TO MAIL
SERVICE

16 Domestic Trunk Carriers
Net Oper-

Total
ating Cost
Fiscal
Net
Operating DirectNon% Alloc. of Mail
Year Expenses (a) Mail Costs (b) Joint Costs to Mail (c)
Service
$ 41,667,608 $ 6,190,833 $ 35,476,875 13.0735 $ 4,637,692
1938
39,248,510 12.0202
1939
46,336,164
7,087,654
4,741,027
10,174,984
48,935,758
1940
59,110,742
9.4426
4,577.850
14,083,049
1941
80,618,852
66,535,803
8.3652
5,538,853
92,764,030
16,864,169
75,899,861
1942
8.8660
6,729,281
18,307,164
1943
82,206,353
63,899,169 15.0622
9,624,621
23,453,584
83,858,471 17.2847
1944
107,312,055
14,494:685
32,722,489
1945
148,744,140
116,021,651 17.1587
19,907,807
1946
236,482,440
61,267,472
175,214,968
9.4755
16,602,494
1947
359,504,418
84,521,133
274,983,285
4.4504
12,237,856
90,403,260
81,379,807
309,023,453
1948
4.6994
14,522,248
Feeder Carriers
$
61,322 $ 1,251,858 15.1011 $ 189,044
1946
$ 1,313,180
572,984
4,373,527
1947
4,946,511
4.5048
197,019
1,578,100
10,618,136
1948
12,196,236
3.3634
357,130
Note: All data for 1938-1941 inclusive were taken from Board of Investigation and Research, op. cit. Tables 1-4, Appendix AA, pp. 811-823.
(a) Data for 1942-45 were taken from CAB Annual Report for 1947, Appendix I, p. 43. Data for 1946, 1947, and 1948 are from CAB Report for 1948, Appendices G and H, pp. 50-53.
(b) Data for 1942-1948 represent the sum of following items from CAB Current Reports of Financial Data for Trunk Line Domestic Air Mail Carriers: "Passenger Service," "Traffic and Sales," "Advertising and Publicity."
(c) Based upon percentage of mail ton miles to total traffic on ton mile basis.
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TABLE II-COMPUTATION OF CHARGES ALLOCABLE TO MAIL SERVICE

16 Domestic Trunk Carriers
Total Joint
Operating
Net Capital & CapitalCosts
Allowance
Net
Allocable
Fiscal
Operating for Return % Allocable Charge to
to Mail
Assets (a) on Assets (b) to Mail (c) Mail Service
Year
$ 5,037,848
13.0735
$ 400,256
$ 24,377,952
$ 2,925,353
1938
5,164,172
12.0202
423,145
27,169,488
3,260,337
1939
4,994,965
9.4426
417,115
1940
35,447,382
4,253,685
6,031,937
8.3652
493,084
49,265,094
5,911,812
1941
268,907
6,998,188
25,275,144
3,033,017
8.8660
1942
427,923
10,052,544
2,841,039
15.0622
1943
23,675,321
14,951,940
2,645,430
17.2847
457,255
1944
22,045,248
20,633,702
17.1587
725,895
1945
35,253,982
4,230,478
9.4755
1,466,855
18,069,349
129,004,188
15,480,503
1946
13,355,891
4.4504
1,118,035
209,350,948
25,122,114
1947
15,969,246
4.6994
1,446,998
1948
256,592,753
30,791,130
Feeder Carriers
$ 198,576
63,120
15.1011
$
9,532
1946
$
526,001
$
19,910
216,929
441,966
4.5048
3,683,052
1947
376,057
3.3634
18,927
4,689,352
562,722
1948
Note: All data for years 1938-1941 inclusive were taken from Board of
Investigation and Research, op. cit., Tables 1-4, Appendix AA, pp. 811-823.
(a) Depreciated cost of total property and equipment. Data for 1942-45 are
from CAB Annual Report for 1947, Appendix K, p. 46. Data for 1946, 1947, and
1948 were supplied by the Rates and Accounts Division of the CAB.
(b) Computed at 12%.
(c) Based upon percentage of mail ton miles to total traffic on ton mile basis.

For recent years this basis is substantially above the net worth of the airlines as published by the CAB, although it is somewhat less than the total invested capital, if long term debt is included.
To arrive at the capital charge allocable to air mail, the value of the
net depreciated assets was multiplied by 12%, and the result was multiplied in turn by a percentage representing the portion of joint costs
allocable to air mail.

In Table II the net joint costs of operation are computed by adding
the allocable portions of joint 'operating expenses and capital charges
for each year; and in Table I the amount of the air mail subsidy is
derived by subtracting the total costs of the air carriers allocable to mail
to the carriers in the
service for each year from the total amounts paid
1
same years for the performance of this service. 3
For the years 1938 through 1948 the amount of the subsidy, as thus
computed, ranged from a low of $9,338,084 in 1946, to a high of
$21,708,844 in 1948. The average for these years is $13,573,400.
A comparison of the subsidy payments for these years with the
subsidy payments for the years 1931 through 1937, Table IV, as computed by the Board of Investigation and Research indicates no trend
toward the elimination of the subsidy. As a matter of fact, the average
subsidy during the years 1938 through 1948 was nearly twice as great
as that for the earlier period, which was only $7,956,240.
13 The figures for the years 1938 through 1941 were taken directly from similar tables published by the Board of Investigation and Research. Figures for the
years 1942 through 1948 were computed as a part of this study.
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TABLE IV-AMOUNT OF SUBSIDY IN EARLIER YEARS (a)

Fiscal

Excess of Air Mail

Year
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937

Payments Over Cost
$ 5,219,090
10,793,112
13,609,946
6,045,446
3,622,015
8,203,086
8,200,988

Total

$55,693,683

Average
$ 7,956,240
(a) From Board of Investigation and Research, op. cit., p. 449 (except for
"total" and "average" figures).

It seems evident from these facts that the carriers have no basis for
a claim on the Post Office Department for more than the amount necessary to reimburse them for the service rendered, and that any payments above this amount must be explained on some basis that does
not relate to the postal services as such. Under the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 they are authorized, in accordance with the "need" clause,
in such amounts as may be necessary to permit the individual carriers
to remain in business. Such payments would not be necessary, even
under the "need" clause, if revenues derived by the carriers from nonmail services were sufficient to cover the costs incurred by them in
providing such other services.

It has been charged 14 that during the war years the volume of mail
dispatched at air mail rates was so great that at times it greatly exceeded
the available capacity of the certificated air carriers and that at such
times some air mail was actually transported by the railroads, other
common carriers, and by the Army Air Forces. To the extent that
this was true the air mail profits of the Post Office Department are
obviously inflated. The computation of the subsidy as presented in
Table I would not be affected by such a situation, however, since this
computation takes no account of total air mail revenues but includes
only payments to air carriers for mail actually carried by them.
It is worthy of mention at this point-that if payments to the carriers
had been on a cost rather than a subsidy basis there would have been
no postal deficit on air mail in any year since 1933.
The amount of the profit or loss to the Post Office Department from
its air mail operations does not constitute a guide as to whether a
subsidy exists. As a result of the very large volume of air mail during
the war years 1943, 1944, and 1945 the Post Office Department realized
substantial profits on its air mail operations. During these same years,
however, the amount of the subsidy was consistently in excess of $12,000,000. One of the principle reasons for designating as a subsidy the
excess of payments to the carriers over the cost of carrying the mail
is the fact that the carriers themselves have no responsibility for and
14 Association of American Railroads, op. cit., p. 55.
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incur no expenses in connection with promoting the use of air mail.
Moreover, the air mail postage rates since 1938 have had no bearing
on the rates at which carriers are reimbursed for carrying the mail.
The Post Office Department has experimented from time to time
with different postage rates for air mail with a view to maximizing the
return from the sale of air mail postage and thereby reducing the
amount of the air mail deficit. Except insofar as different air mail
postage rates have resulted in a variation in the amount of mail to be
carried these experiments have had but little bearing on the payments
to the carriers.
In the event the air mail costs and revenues of the Post Office
Department were such that a profit was regularly earned by the
Department on air mail business, the equitable adjustment would
seem to be a reduction in air mail postage rates. Such an adjustment of
air mail postage rates would have no bearing of course on the amount of
subsidy in payments to the carriers, as that term is used here. So long as
a profit is earned on air mail the users of that service are in effect subsidizing in some degree whatever other postal services may be operated at
a deficit.
BIG FIVE MAIL ]RATE PROCEEDING

During 1947 three 15 of the Big Four airlines which had been carrying mail at the established "service" rate of 45 cents per ton-mile, and
Northwest Airlines, which had been carrying mail at a service rate of
60 cents per ton-mile, petitioned the Civil Aeronautics Board for an
upward revision of these rates. The petitions of TWA, United Air
Lines, and Northwest Air Lines requested that the revision be made
retroactively effective. All of the petitioning carriers, except Eastern,
operated at substantial losses during the twelve months ending September 30, 1947, and Eastern's rate of profit for the nine months prior
to that date had shown a decided decline under the rate for the twelve
months ended December 31, 1946. Each sought relief under the socalled "need" clause of the Civil Aeronautics Act (Sec. 406 (b)).
The Board's March 29, 1948 Statement of Tentative Findings and
Conclusions"e is of interest because it established a new doctrine of
"self-sufficiency" under which the five carriers are to be excluded from
consideration under the "need" clause.
In the Board's opinion (p. 21 of the "Statement"),
"It is apparent that if all other revenue of the carriers is sufficient to permit the carrier to fulfill the objectives under the Act
1.r
Eastern Air Lines, TWA, and United Air Lines. American Air Lines, the
other Big Four carrier, filed no petition.
16 On March 29, 1948, the Civil Aeronautics Board issued a "Statement of
Tentative Findings and Conclusions" concerning these petitions and issued orders
to each of the petitioning carriers and the American Air Lines, ordering them to
"show cause" as to why a new basis of air mail payments should not be established. American was included because the new basis was to be applied as the new
"service" rate for all carriers formerly on a 45 cents per ton-mile basis. Dockets
2849 (TWA), 3014 (United), 3021 (Eastern), .3211 (Northwest), and 3309
(American).
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in respect to service other than the mail service, the need of the
air carrier for mail compensation will then depend solely upon the
costs of performing the mail service .... The status of self-sufficiency as contemplated by the Act may therefore be stated as
representing that state in the carriers' economic development at
which, under honest, economical, and efficient management, the
volume and character of non-mail services required in the public
interest may be fully supported by the revenues from such services
under fair and reasonable rates to the public."

In the application of this principle, according to the statement, the
Board will not be guided by the actual gains or losses of particular
air line companies since these involve the exercise of business judgment
over which the Board has no control and the consequences of which,
including the results of mistaken judgment, ought to be borne by the
companies themselves. In the words of the Board,
"the real test of self-sufficiency is not confined to the attainment
of a profitable level of operations but rather is related to the existence of a reasonable opportunity for a carrier to sustain itself at a
profitable level without Government subsidies" (p. 25).
After a detailed analysis of
five companies at the "service"
concluded that each of them is
longer entitled to consideration
lishment of mail rates. It also

the operations and earnings of these
rates in effect since 1942 the Board
now "self-sufficient" and therefore no
under the "need" clause in the estabdetermined that the new schedule of

payments would not be applied retroactively.
This new schedule 17 of payments is based on the principle that for
the transportation of minimum loads, carriers are entitled to higher
rates because of the heavy investment costs necessary to establish and
maintain a mail service, and that as the volume of mail increases the
17 The schedule as proposed by the Board is as follows (p. 64 of "Statement")

Ton-mile Mail Rate
Mail
Applicable to
Ton-miles
Each Block
per day
75.0 cents
0- 2,500
70.0 cents
2,501-15,000
65.0 cents
5,001-10,000
60.0 cents
10,001-15,000
55.0 cents
15,001-20,000
50.0 cents
20,001-25,000
45.0 cents
25,001-30,000
40.0 cents
30,001-and over
The practical effect of the new rate schedule is presented by the Board in the
following table, which applies the schedule to estimated mail volume for the immediate future (p. 65) :
Effective
Mail Ton-Miles
Annual
Mail Rate
Annual
Daily
Average
Mail Pay
Per Ton-Mile
Carrier
Total
$4,757,000
62.62c
American
7,597,000
20,814
2,604,000
68.38c
3,808,000
10,433
Eastern
70.90c
2,323,000
6,364
1,647,000
Northwest
61.45c
22,926
5,142,000
TWA
8,368,000
26,356
5,743,000
39.70c
United
9,620,000
The Board estimated (in a press release issued April 7, 1948) that the effect
of its new schedule would be to increase the air mail payments to these carriers by
a total of $5,271,000.
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rates of pay may be successively reduced because of the greater volume
*of service over which these and other overhead costs may be distributed.
There is no suggestion in the Board's statement in this case that
the carriers concerned had suffered a loss on their air mail business
at the old rate of 45 cents, a ton-mile. The analysis of the financial
and traffic data for the companies concerned for the twelve-month
period ended September 30, 1947, in Table V discloses that air mail
payments based on a rate of 45 cents a ton-mile were, with but one
exception, more than adequate to cover all costs allocable to the mail
service performed, as measured by the formula used here. The net
total subsidy benefits for the group as a whole during this period
amounted to $718,983.
In view of the Board's earlier discussion of the principle of selfsufficiency and its expressed determination not to consider in the mail
rates for these carriers the cost of any non-mail services, it is somewhat
paradoxical that the actual effect of the order is to provide additional
subsidy benefits to the carriers concerned.
The Board points out, in support of its new schedule of service
rates, that the ratio of air mail to the total traffic of the carriers has
been steadily reduced because of the increase in passenger and other
business, and that a straight pro-ration of costs between mail and non
TABLE V-SUBSIDY FACTORS IN OPERATING DATA FOR BIG FIVE CERTIFICATED AIR
CARRIERS FOR 12 MONTHS ENDING SEPT. 30, 1947 (a)

Items

American

Eastern Northwest

TWA

United

Air Mail Revenues $ 3,297,000 $ 1,496,000 $ 1,264,000 $ 2,844,000 $ 3,952,000
Air Mail Costs
3,268,737
1,256,011
975,020
3,043,431
3,590,798
Subsidyor (deficit) $
28,263 $ 239,989 $ 288,980 $ (199,431)$
361,202
Expenses-Total $ 81,118,000 $44,480,000 $22,074,000 $49,624,000 $ 69,879,000
Non Mail Items
Passenger Service 6,217,000
3,748,000
1,480,000
3,920,000
6,672,000
Traffic & Sales
9,243,000
5,599,000
2,336,000
6,242,000
9,051,000
Adv. & Publ.
2,125,000
1,443,000
426,000
1,374,000
1,674,000
Total Non Mail
$ 17,585,000 $10,790,000 $ 4,242,000 $11,536,000 $ 17,397,000
Net Joint Costs
$ 63,533,000 $33,690,000 $17,832,000 $38,088,000 $ 52,482,000
% Allocable to Mail
4.4075
3.4288
5.0876
7.2370
6.1439
(A) Amount Allocable to Mail $ 2,800,216 $ 1,155,163 $ 881,172 $ 2,756,429 $ 3,224,442
Investment
$ 88,584,000 $24,510,000 $15,372,000 $33,048,000 $ 49,691,000
Allocable to Mail
3,904,340
840,399
782,066
2,391,684
3,052,965
(B) Allowable Return (12%)
$
468,521 $ 100,848 $
93,848 $ 287,002 $
366,356
Total Air Mail
Costs (A & B) $ 3,268,737 $ 1,256,011 $ 975,020 $ 3,043,431 $ 3,590,798
Traffic Data (ton miles)
Passengers
144,811,100 88,955,100 36,711,200 72,380,800 118,723,200
Express
5,592,297
3,975,586
1,757,945
4,906,896
6,894,852
Freight
9,449,900
1,488,317
495,607
3,593,519
8,335,445
Air Mail
7,370,468
3,352,423
2,088,643
6,310,077
8,768,760
Total
167,223,765 97,771,426 41,053,395 87,191,292 142,722,257
% Air Mail
4.4075
3.4288
5.0876
7.2370
6.1439
(a) Note: Financial Data are from CAB "Release of Operating Revenue
and Expense Statistics for the 12 months ended September 30, 1947; Domestic Air
Carriers (Trunk Lines)." Traffic Data are from CAB "Release of Mileage and
Traffic Statistics for the 12 months ended September 30, 1947; Domestic Air Carriers (Trunk Lines)."
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mail services on the basis of this ratio is no longer a fair measure of
the cost of the mail service, because it does not take account of certain
minimum costs incidental to air mail service which should not be
pro-rated.
As to these costs the Board states:
"Although the costs directly incident to mail service cannot be
accurately measured at this time, they are sufficiently sizeable as to
require recognition in the mail rate."
It is difficult to appraise the validity of the Board's policy in designating the new schedule as a service schedule because of the Board's
acknowledged inability to measure in dollar terms the factors which
warrant service payments above the total amount of the allocated costs.',
As to the frequency of schedules required for air mail service the
Postmaster General has found in nearly every case that the needs of
the Post Office Department could be met by fewer schedules than those
actually maintained by the carriers for the convenience of passengers; 19
although it is true that in some instances it has been necessary to
schedule mail flights at hours when very few passengers desire to fly.
Finally it should be pointed out that the certificated air carriers as
a group have always been paid at a higher rate per ton-mile of air mail
than they have received in revenues for a corresponding amount of
passenger business.
Commenting on the Board's new service rate as set forth in the
Big Five case, the Postmaster General StAted: 2 °
"The uniform service rate formula which the Board proposes to
apply in determining the mail compensation for the five carriers
involved would provide an effective mail rate per ton-mile which
exceeds the fair and reasonable rate necessary to compensate the
carriers for the costs of carrying the mail plus a reasonable return
upon the investment devoted to that service. The wide spread
which exists between the Board's tentative finding of the estimated
assigned costs of carrying the mail (which are not based on true
costs) and the estimated effective rate under the proposed uniform
service rate formula indicates a reliance upon the mail pay to support more than its just share of the costs. This could produce a
,need' rate rather than a 'service' rate."
18 It may be pointed out, however, that, generally speaking, planes on which
mail is carried are built and operated primarily with a view to providing passenger transportation, and that the cost of providing the physical facilities required
by passengers is probably greater than would be indicated by an allocation of joint
costs on the ratio of ton-miles of passenger traffic to total traffic. Passengers require many cubic feet of air space for instance, in addition to the space they actually occupy. It is for their benefit that the air in the plane must be heated or
cooled depending on the season. It is for their comfort and convenience that overstuffed seats are provided and that the interior of the plane is lighted. Much simpler and less expensive facilities are required for transporting the. mail. Recent
expenditures for larger, faster aircraft have not been made .because of air mail
service requirements but wholly because of a desire to improve passenger service.
19 Civil Aeronautics Board, Regulatory Standards and Policies Under the
Civil Aeronautics Act, an unpublished document prepared by Mr. Albert R. Beisel,
Jr., in 1945 while a member of the General Counsel's Office (mimeographed), p. 33.
20 U. S. Post Office Department, A Reply of the Postmaster General to the
Civil Aeronautics Board's "Statement of Tentative Findings and Conclusions"
(in the Big Five Case), June 7, 1948 (mimeographed), p. 2.
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These facts provide some basis for questioning the Board's designation of the new schedule as "service" rates, and for the contention
that the amount of the air mail subsidy has been substantially increased
21
by air mail payments to the Big Five carriers at these new rates.
PROSPECTS FOR ELIMINATING THE AIR MAIL SUBSIDY

It is true that until the last year or two the average rate of payment
per ton-mile has declined sharply. However, the total of air mail payments to carriers has not declined during the last ten years but has
actually increased by substantial amounts over a portion of the period
and it is now considerably greater than at the beginning of the period.
There has been a good deal of discussion in aviation circles recently
about a proposal that all first class mail be sent by air, at regular first
class rates whenever it would expedite delivery.
The suggestion that subsidy payments can be eliminated by increasing the volume of mail to be carried indicates a failure to understand
the circumstances that have made a subsidy necessary. As we have seen,
for the certificated air carriers as a group, the rates of air mail pay have
consistently provided income to the carriers substantially greater than
the costs they have incurred in carrying the mail. Payments in excess
of such costs would not have been necessary were it not for the fact
that revenues from passenger transportation and other services offered
by the carriers have failed to cover the costs incurred in providing such
services.
It is true that an increase in the amount of air mail carried would
probably reduce the portion of costs allocable to each ton-mile of
traffic carried. It is also true, of course, that as the volume of mail
increases the amount of subsidy in the payment for each ton-mile of air
mail service may be reduced, and this is probably one of the principal
reasons why it has been possible to reduce the rate of air mail payments
to the carriers as the volume of air mail increased. So long as the
revenue derived from non-mail services fails to cover the cost of such
services, however, some form of subsidy benefits will apparently be
necessary regardless of the amount of air mail which may be carried.
Moreover, the aggregate amount of subsidy payments necessary under
present policies2" will always be governed by the extent of the losses
incurred in the performance of other services, rather than by the volume of air mail carried.
21 It should be noted in this connection that by the establishment of uniform
rates of mail pay, which provide for each of two or more carriers, the Civil
Aeronautics Board has been more liberal than the Civil Aeronautics Act requires
in authorizing payments under the need clause. For if the rates of mail pay are
such that they meet the "need" of the least "profitable" carrier, then the same
rates of pay will provide for the better carriers some amount greater than they
actually require to enable them to continue the performance of air transportation
services.
22 The present arrangements concerning air mail payments have put the
Post Office Department very much "in the middle." That Department is obliged
to pay air mail carriers at rates established by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Ordinarily the Department has had no advance notice of the Board's decisions,
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TOTAL COSTS OF AIR TRANSPORTATION

It was noted at the beginning of this paper that the costs of commercial aviation' to the Federal Government include not only the air
mail subsidy but also the costs incident to the maintenance and operations of the Federal Airways, the Federal portion of airport construction
costs, and the cost of air weather services.

In Table VI there is presented a combined profit and loss statement
showing the net profit or loss for the combined system during the years

1944 through 1948 and indicating what the earnings position of the
scheduled air carriers would have been if they had been obliged to
meet the full cost of the combined operation. According to this table,
the scheduled air carriers could have met the full cost of the combined
operation during 1944 and 1945 and yet retained some margin of profit.
Absorption of the total cost in 1946, however, woud have converted a
profit into a loss and in 1947 it would have increased the amount of the
loss from about $30,500,000 to more than $64,000,000. For 1948 the loss
would have been increased from about $27,000,000 to more than $66,000,000.
The total estimated cost of the scheduled air carrier system for 1944
was $132,604,463, of which the Federal Government paid 19.07%. The
total estimated cost for 1948 was $464,186,015, an increase of approxiTABLE VI-SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS JOINT PROFIT AND Loss STATEMENT

(Showing federal and private participation in a joint undertaking
to provide air transportation)
1944
The Air Lin

Companies' *

Non-Mail Rev. $106,010,172
U.S. Mail Rev. 28,031,183
Total Revenues $134,041,355
Operating Exp. 107,312,055
Oper. Profit t $ 26,729,300
Deduct:
Air Mail Subsidy 13,079,243
$ 13,650,057
Adj. Profit t

1945

1946

1947

1948

$156,320,249 $224,748,386 $316,775,341 $350,139,397
47,180,043
27,773,406
28,576,774
35,544,065
$191,864,314 $253,325,160 $344,548,747 $397,319,440
148,744,140 237,795,620 364,450,929 402,599,496
$ 43,120,174 $ 15,529,540 $(19,902,182)$ (5,280,056)
14,910,363
$ 28,209,811 $

21,708,844
10,611,526
9,338,084
6,191,456 $ (30,513,708) $ (26,988,900)

Deduct: Estimated expenses borne by Federal Government.

32,531,212
26,716,627
20,224,292
10,303,891
Federal Airways 9,692,689
4,337,063
4,549,176
4,598,576
2,715,082
1,533,578
Airport Const.
3,009,400
2,790,342
1,647,454
1,079,880
986,898
Weather Services
Total Estimated
Federal Costs $ 12,213,165 $ 14,098,853 $ 26,470,322 $ 34,056,145 $ 39,877,675
Joint Profitt $ 1,436,892 $ 14,110,958 $(20,278,866)$(64,569,853)$(66,866,575)
Data for 1944 and 1945 are from CAB Annual Report for 1947,
* Note:
Appendix I, p. 43. Data for 1946, 1947, and 1948 represent totals of data for
trunk and feeder carriers as published in, CAB Annual Report for 1948, Appendices G and H, except that mail revenues have been adjusted for retroactive payments authorized through April 21, 1949. All data are on a fiscal year basis.
t Figures in parentheses are losses.
many of which are retroactive. As a result it has frequently been necessary for
the Department to request supplemental appropriations from the Congress, and
to explain and defend an action taken by another agency.
Post Office officials have urged that the Civil Aeronautics Board be given
responsibility for justifying the need for appropriations to provide subsidy
payments to the carriers. It is pointed out that such an arrangement concerning
maritime mail services is now operating very satisfactorily.
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mately 250% over 1944, of which the Federal Government paid an estimated total of 13.27% or $61,586,519. Accurate figures are not available for the years before 1944. Although the FederalAirways and the
airports used by the scheduled carriers had in 1944 a very considerable
latent capacity, the actual costs of Federal participation in our air
transport system more than doubled during the five year period; this
suggests that the continued growth of scheduled air carrier business
will probably impose an increasing burden on the Federal taxpayer,
instead of reducing it as aviation enthusiasts have heretofore confidently
expected.
Analysis of Costs and Revenues
The costs and revenues incident to the air mail services of the
carriers have been considered above. It is pertinent to give some consideration at this point to the cost-revenue relationships for other
types of traffic.
The revenues derived from passenger, freight and express service
are clearly separated in the published reports of the Civil Aeronautics
Board. To arrive at separate cost figures for each of these types of.
traffic total joint costs were apportioned, as in the case of air mail, in
accordance with the proportion of the ton-miles of each type of traffic
to the total ton miles of transportation service provided. The profits
and losses by types of traffic as thus computed are shown in Table VII.
TABLE VII-SUMMARY OF' PROFITS AND LOSSES BY TYPES OF TRAFFIC

(Under Present Arrangements) *
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
Passenger Business $ 9,858,176 $22,882,176 $ 602,236$ (36,718,562) $ (25,234,703)
Express Business
2,327,971
3,708,779
1,566,251
994
(2,959,211)
Freight Business
(25,148) (2,716,831) (12,210,435)
Misc. Revenue (a)
1,003,476
819,327
1,099,049
2,629,167
1,740,060
Non-Sched. Transp. (a) 7,624
63,539
501,917
12564,521
1,083,567
Net Income From
Non-Mail Business $13,197,247 $27,473,821 $ 3,744,305$ (35,240,711) $ (37,580,722)
Air Mail Profit (b) 13,536,498 15,636,258 11,785,236 15,338,531
32,300,665
Total Profit or Loss
on Current Basis $26,733,745 $43,110,079 $15,529,541$(19,902,180)$ (5,280,057)
* Note:
Derived from revenues and expenses for 1944 and 1945 as reported
in CAB Annual Report for 1947, Appendix V, p. 43, and for 1946, 1947, and 1948
as reported in Appendices G and H (pp. 50-53) of the CAB Annual Report for
1948. Total joint expense was allocated to several types of traffic on basis of the
ratio of the ton miles of each type of traffic to the total ton miles of traffic.
(a) No expenses were charged against these items.
(b) Revenues less allocable portion of costs with no allowance for capital
charges.

The results of such an analysis as applied to freight revenues and
costs are rather startling for they show that on the basis of such a cost
distribution the carriers lost in 1948 more than $12,000,000 on their
freight business alone. See Table VIII.
The policies of the carriers and o' the CAB with respect to freight
rates present something of a conundrum when compared with their
policies with respect to air mail rates. The average rates for the carry-
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TABLE VIII-COMPUTATION OF PROFIT OR Loss ON FREIGHT BUSINESS

Net Joint Costs Allocable to Freight Freight

Year
1946 (T)
Total (F)

Costs (a) Per cent (b) Amount
$175,214,968
1,251,858

.9610

$ 1,683,816

.....

$ 1,683,8i6 $ 1,658,668 $

3.2364
.1468

$ 8,899,559 $ 6,187,359
6,420
1,789
$ 8,905,979 $ 6,189,148

1948 (T)
(F)

7.4506
2.2960

$23,024,101
243,792

(a)
(b)
(c)
data for

(Loss)

$ 1,658,668

1947 (T) $274,983,285
(F)
4,373,527
Total
$309,023,453
10,618,136

Profit or

Revenues (c)

(25,148)

$ (2,716,831)

$11,015,497
41,961

$23,267,893 $11,057,458 $ (12,210,435)
See Table II, Column 3 (T-Trunk Lines; F-Feeder Lines).
Based upon ratio of ton miles of freight to total ton miles of traffic.
CAB Annual Report for 1948, Appendices G and H, pp. 50-53. Freight
Feeder Lines for 1946 was not separately reported.

ing of air mail, as established by the Board in the Big Five case in the
spring of 1948, were in excess of sixty cents a ton mile. These rates
have been increased by subsequent actions of the Board. During the
same year the Board established a minimum rate of only sixteen cents
a ton mile for freight shipments of 1,000 ton miles or less and a rate
of only thirteen cents a ton mile for shipments of air freight in excess
of 1,000 ton miles.2 8 The discrepancy between these two rate schedules
becomes even more surprising when it is noted that the Post Office
department performs all important handling of air mail on the ground
before and after air mail flights, whereas the carriers are obliged to
provide the necessary ground facilities and services for the handling
of their air-freight business. It appears, therefore, that the encouragement of air freight business on the part of the certificated carriers
is resulting in a need for larger subsidy payments than would otherwise be the case.
Profits and losses attributable to passenger business fluctuated
widely during the years 1941 through 1948. This type of business
earned a high of $22,882,176 during the fiscal year 1945 when the war
was making its maximum demands on all types of passenger transportation facilities. It sustained a loss of $36,718,562 in 1947, and a
loss of $25,234,703 in 1948.
Passenger traffic accounts for the bulk of the business of the scheduled air carriers. As a proportion of the total ton-miles of pay load
carried, it ranged during the period under consideration from a low
of 76.24% to a high of 88.56%. It is evident from this fact and in view
of the earnings record with respect to air mail and express that it is the
passenger business which has given rise to the need for financial and
other assistance from the Federal Government.
If the scheduled air carriers had been obliged to absorb their proportionate share of the cost of facilities and services provided at
Government expense, and if there had been no subsidy in the air mail
payments, the passenger business would have earned no profits during
23 Civil Aeronautics Board, Annual Report, 1948, p. 19.
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the years 1944-1948 and the losses in 1947 and 1948 would have been
$81,386,233 and $86,821,222 respectively. It is evident that air line
passengers paid only a fraction of the cost of the services they purchased
with their tickets.
THE ECONOMICS OF AIR TRANSPORTATION

"There are two cardinal principles in successful air transportation:
keep your planes in the air and keep them full."' 24 Conformance with
these principles is essentially a problem of correlating the number, size,
and utilization of aircraft with the number of persons who desire to
fly, in such a way as to maximize the utilization of aircraft capacity.
It is not possible, of course, in the maintenance of an air transportation business on a common carrier basis to utilize all available capacity
on all flights scheduled; and it is not possible, without turning passengers away, to ensure that each passenger who leaves at an intermediate point will be replaced at that point. In addition, there are
certain weather and seasonal factors which cannot be exactly compensated for in the amount of passenger space made available. Characteristically, therefore, air carriers must follow the practice of providing
on scheduled flights more passenger carrying facilities than will
ordinarily be required.
Mr. Hugh Knowlton estimates that the maximum load factor which
25
an air carrier can ordinarily obtain is between 70 and 75 per cent.
Professor Claude Puffer is of the opinion that an air line cannot
ordinarily expect to maintain an -annual load factor much in excess
of 65 per cent. 6 The actual load factor of the scheduled air carriers,
as a group, reached a high of 89.50 per cent in 1944. This was during
the war, at a time when the demand for air travel was so consistently
in excess of capacity that the Government was obliged to establish a
system of air travel priorities in order to ensure that persons traveling
on business connected with the war could be assured of seats on
airplanes.
The break-even point characteristically fluctuates inversely with
the spread between the average fare and the average cost per available
seat mile. Thus in 1941, when the spread was $0.0191, the break-even
point was only 64.57 per cent. Unfortunately, the average load factor
for that year was considerably less so that a loss was sustained on passenger traffic. In 1944, on the other hand, when the spread was only
$0.0094, the break-even point was 81.96 per cent. Because the actual
load factor was 89.50, a worthwhile profit was earned on passenger
business that year. In 1946 when the spread was only $0.0064 the
break-even point was the highest for the period, being 86.45 per cent.
24 KNOWLTON,
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As A BUSINESS (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 48.
25 Ibid., p. 49.
26 PUFFER, op. cit., p. 48. Note: The term "capacity factor" might well be

used to designate the maximum possible load factor.
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With a load factor of 85.92 per cent, a small loss was sustained on
seats sold that year, but this was more than offset by the revenues from
excess baggage.
If the airlines had been obliged to absorb the costs covered by the
subsidy during the years 1944 through 1948, the break-even point,
other factors remaining unchanged, would have been consistently
higher than any actual load factor ever achieved by the scheduled air
carriers, as a group, over the course of a full year's operations. As a
matter of fact, during the fiscal years 1944 and 1948, the air carriers
could not have covered their costs, at the fares then in effect, even if
they had consistently operated their planes at 100 per cent of passenger capacity.
The load'factor of 70.99 per cent for the fiscal year 1947 represents,
according to the authorities cited above, a reasonable expectancy under
normal operating circumstances. This load factor resulted from an
actual 6,224,356,000 passenger miles for that year. Presuming that the
operating costs were held to a minimum and that the average fare could
have been raised to any necessary point without loss of business, it
would have been necessary to charge a rate of $0.0610 per passenger
mile in order to obtain total revenues sufficient to cover the full costs
of operation including the costs covered by the Federal subsidy. Such
a rate of fare would have provided a spread of $0.0181 over the total
cost per available seat mile. It is exceedingly doubtful, however,
whether any such fare could have been charged without a serious loss
of passenger business.
"THE QUEST FOR VOLUME

The development of the commercial aviation industry has been
predicated on the assumption that increased volume will result in
lower unit costs. Federal agencies responsible for the Government's
policies toward aviation have supported the industry in that point
of view.
There is a good deal of evidence to indicate that this assumption
has been warranted over the years since 1926. The increase in the
number of passengers carried and the reduction in plane-mile costs
7
and in passenger fares since that year has been truly remarkable.1 If
these trends were to continue, they might culminate in an ultimate
relationship between fares and operating costs which would thereafter
assure the profitable performance of air passenger business. There are
certain facts, however, which suggest that the prospect of further expansion in the demand for air travel is now subject to some rather
definite limitations.
27 A substantial portion of the decrease in costs achieved by the airlines has
been made possible by the improvements in aircraft design. The extent to which
planes may be made still more efficient is a question for aeronautical engineers.
Cost data for recent years suggest, however, that the rate of improvement may
be levelling off since the introduction of the large new post war planes.
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The airlines themselves appear to have undertaken their post
war expansion program with an optimism which took too little account
of the absolute limits of the demand for travel at rates they could
reasonably expect to charge; for, in May, 1946, the estimated annual
capacity of planes owned and on order by the certificated air carriers
was 20.9 billion passenger miles. Utilization of all this capacity would
require passenger traffic at more than three times the rate actually
achieved in 1946. The improbability of such an achievement is emphasized by the fact that such a volume of traffic would equal or exceed
the revenue passenger miles in railroad coaches and Pullman cars for
any of the pre-war years from 1937 to 1940.28
AIR MAIL PAYMENTS AND AIR MAIL SUBSIDY
(1958-1948)
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One of the principal factors detracting from current use of air
travel is the failure to maintain regular schedules. This failure is
primarily a consequence of bad weather conditions. There is some
prospect that the technical problems of all-weather traffic control will
be solved and that ultimately scheduled air carriers may hope to maintain service with a regularity approaching that of the railroads. This
prospect lies in the $1,113,000,000 Radio Technical Commission for
Aeronautics SC-31 Program.
Unfortunately, the cost involved in this project is so very great as
to make it exceedingly improbable that the scheduled air carriers,
even with a great increase in volume could earn enough to enable them
to pay their proportionate share of the installation costs. Moreover,
the annual cost of operating the Federal Airways will be so greatly increased by this program that even if the installation costs were written
off as an unrecoverable item, it is doubtful whether the proportionate
share of the annual operating costs could be carried by the airlines.
In other words, the technical means for establishing regularity of
airline operations, and for greatly improving the margin of safety in
air travel may be available within a comparatively short span of years.
But the proposal to carry out such a plan seems uneconomic because
it will probably cost more than it can ever earn. It must be justified,
therefore, primarily on the basis of its potential contribution to our
national defense.
The circumstance which makes the RTCA proposal uneconomic,
is the fact that, barring another war or a very drastic change in our
national habits, the maximum number of potential travelers, whether
by air or by rail, is definitely limited, and the combined capacity of
rail and air carriers seems to be rapidly approaching that limit.
Assuming that the RTCA program were to be adopted, and that
adequate safety and regularity of airline operations were established,
the airlines could scarcely hope to do better than double their present
rate of operations. It seems exceedingly unlikely, in view of the information now available, that such a volume of business would provide
revenue sufficient to cover their costs plus the greatly increased costs,
to the Federal Government incidental to the operation of the Federal
Airways under the RTCA plan.
The railroads contend, and some corroborating evidence has been
presented here, that the rapid development of air travel, in competition
with first class rail travel has been possible only because of the very
substantial assistance afforded the aviation industry by the Federal
Government.
The essential obstacle that confronts the air carriers in their efforts
to compete with other types of transportation is that the airplane is a
very expensive vehicle to operate. Unlike most forms of transportation,
it must not only generate sufficient power to pull itself forward, but
, American Association of Railroads, op. cit., p. 77.
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must also generate sufficient power to maintain itself in the air over
sustained periods of time.
It seems clear that the prospect for the economic self-sufficiency of
scheduled air carriers, under the present policies of the Federal Government, the present and probable future demand for air travel, and
the continued utilization of the present, practicable, flight techniques,
is very dim indeed. It seems probable that the certificated air carriers
will continue to require Federal aids in one form or another in the
foreseeable future and that the growth of commercial aviation will
probably require greater, instead of less, expenditures on the part
of the Federal Government if it is to continue its present role in the
joint enterprise of providing commercial air transportation.
If this is true, it is a matter of very considerable importance, for
it negates one of the major promises on which Federal aids to aviation
have heretofore been justified. Federal assistance to aviation has been
viewed as aid to a new and expanding industry which would some
day become economically self-sufficient, and earn enough revenues so
that the Government could recover some portion if not all of the
expenditures it has made with funds derived from general taxation.
If the foregoing analysis is sound, it means that further expansion of
passenger business by scheduled air carriers no longer offers the prospect of ultimate economic self-sufficiency, but will probably result in
an increasing demand for subsidies, in one form or another, to be paid
by the Federal Government.
WHO BENEFITS?

There remains for consideration a brief analysis of the question:
who or what has been the beneficiary of the air mail subsidies paid?
It is obvious that the subsidies have made it possible for the commercial air line companies to stay in business and to develop the arts
of aerial navigation. The owners and operators of air lines have thus
benefitted directly from such payments.
It has been pointed out that since its inception the delivery of
mail to persons in rural areas, the so-called rural free delivery service,
has cost the Government far in excess of the postal revenues earned
on this class of mail. Yet there has been no complaint about the
subsidy of the rural mail carriers, many of whom in recent years have
carried such mail on a contract basis. As a matter of fact, most people
would agree that in this case it is not the rural mail carrier but the
farmer whose operations are subsidized by this extra service.
The situations are not altogether parallel, since presumably the
payments to the rural carriers approximate the cost of the service
rendered, whereas we have shown that payments to air carriers have
been substantially in excess of the true costs incurred by them in
carrying the air mail.
This discrepancy suggests the possibility of yet another beneficiary
of the air mail subsidy, viz. the air line passenger. To the extent that
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the air mail subsidies have been applied against losses incurred in
the performance of passenger carrying services, the passengers themselves have benefited, since without the aid of the air mail subsidy
the carriers would presumably have been obliged to charge a higher
passenger fare; in which event of course, some of the air passengers
might have elected to travel by other means.
CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the history of the Federal subsidy to commercial
aviation, and having noted the nature and trend of the several types
of subsidy benefits, it is appropriate to consider what conclusions may
be drawn from this study. The more important of these may be enumerated as follows:
(1) It seems evident that the facts of the situation, as disclosed
and analyzed in this study, offer little hope or encouragement to
those who still expect that commercial air transportation can become truly self-supporting within the framework of existing legislation, administrative policies, and flight techniques.
(2) It seems probable that further expansion of the commercial
air transport industry, under present circumstances, will result in
greater rather than less subsidy benefits in the years ahead. This
conclusion is based primarily on the fact that the expansion will
almost surely require increased direct expenditures on the part
of the Government for the improvement, maintenance, and operation of the Federal Airways, for the improvement of air terminal
facilities, and for expanded weather services.
(3) There is no present prospect for the elimination of the air
mail subsidy. The average amount of this subsidy as herein computed for the years 1938 through 1948 was nearly twice the average
amount of the subsidy for the years 1931 through 1937; in spite of
the fact that the volume of all types of business carried by the
certificated carriers increased several fold during the latter period.
It should be emphasized here that the need for this subsidy will
continue so long as non-mail services of the carriers fail to pay
their own way, and that increasing the volume of air mail to be
carried offers no solution to the problem. Special consideration
should be given in the immediate future to the influence of the
increasing volume of air freight on the carriers' need for air mail
subsidy payments.
(4) Although representatives of the industry have talked recently
in terms of the "restoration" of a "sound financial situation,"
there has never been a time, with the exception of the abnormal
years of peak wartime traffic, when the certificated air carriers, as
a group, could have paid their own way, including their fair proportion of the cost of the Federal Airways, airports, and weather
services.
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(5) The foregoing analysis suggests that Government and industry officials may have been unwise in attempting the development
of a "mass" air transportation system. The costs inherent in the
operation of aircraft, and the limited need for transportation at
very high speeds appear to preclude bona fide competition with
railroads and buses for large volumes of traffic.
It is fair to ask on what grounds it is held that a subsidy to the
domestic air commerce industry ought not to be continued indefinitely.
In reply to such a question it is pertinent to list some of the more
important considerations which have justified Federal subsidies to
private enterprise. Among the more important of these are the
following:
(1) The need to equalize differences in costs for companies competing in international trade; as in the case of the merchant marine, and the "overseas" air carriers.
(2) The general public acceptance of the need for assistance to
"infant" industries which promise great benefits to the public at
large. The land grants to the railroads were warranted largely on
this basis.
(3) The need to offer some inducement for "voluntary" cooperation in crop control programs which benefit not only millions of
farmers, but which also result, it is argued, in benefits to consumers
through the stabilization of food prices.
(4) The need in times of national emergency to insure maximum
utilization of all capacity for the production of war goods without
permitting prices in general to rise to a level sufficient to cover
the costs of marginal producers.
The subsidy to .commercial aviation in its "infancy" has been
justified and accepted under the second of the considerations listed
above. Once it was evident that the industry in its early stages was
not able to support itself, this consideration became the dominant
factor in the continuation of various Federal aids. Such an argument
can hardly be sustained, however, once the industry has outgrown its
"infancy," and the data presented above indicate that that time has
now arrived.
The potential military value of our commercial air transport
system affords a special basis for providing Federal aid, and some such
aid would probably be continued on the ground of military necessity
even though the expectation that the airlines could become economically self sufficient were abandoned. This fact, however, should not
preclude a reconsideration of existing Government policies with a
view to finding some means for eliminating the subsidy, if that is possible, or for ensuring that subsidy benefits will be kept as small as
possible in the general interests of economy.
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Suggested Steps Toward a Solution
This study has been directed primarily toward a more adequate
understanding of the problems presented by the present subsidy of
commercial aviation. It has not been directed toward the development
of solutions to these problems. Nevertheless, the data that have been
considered here afford some basis for suggestions as to steps that might
be taken to improve the situation.
(1) The first, and most obvious, of the suggestions that can be made is
that an investigation of the type attempted here should be undertaken by
some group having the resources and authority of the Federal Government.

Such a study might be specifically authorized by the Congress or it
might be undertaken by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to his
general responsibilities for the welfare of the aviation industry. Although the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration could contribute much to such an investigation, they are so
closely identified with the present arrangements that more objective results would probably be obtained if responsibility for the project were
placed elsewhere.
Similar studies were made by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation for the years 1934 through 1938, and by the Board of Investigation and Research for the years 1938 through 1941. The work begun
by these groups needs to be brought up to date to take account of the
changes brought about by the war and by the industry's achievement of
technological maturity. Moreover, the aviation aspects of these earlier
studies were somewhat obscured by the fact that the studies were concerned with subsidies to all forms of transportation.
(2) Pending the completion of such an investigation, which would pre-

sumably include a consideration of the possible bases for the allocation of
air carrier expenses between air mail and other traffic, it is suggested
that the formula developed by the Federal Coordinator of Transportation
should be adopted by the Civil Aeronautics Board, and that the Board
should include in its statistical reports information as to the amount of
subsidy in air mail payments as thus computed.

Publication of such data on a current basis would provoke lively
discussion among the carriers themselves as well as among the Federal
agencies concerned and would undoubtedly result in many suggestions
for improvement in the formula.
(3) It is suggested that the Secretary of Commerce, in collaboration with

the Secretary of National Defense, should establish a basis for the allocation of the expenses of the Federal Airways, the air weather services, and
the Federal portion of airport construction costs, among the scheduled air
carriers, other private flyers, and the military air forces; and that the
Secretary of Commerce should develop specific proposals for making an
appropriate recovery of Federal expenses from the scheduled air carriers
and other private flyers who benefit from the use of these facilities.

The Civil Aeronautics Administration took some steps in this direction in its study of 1946 on "Charging for Federal Airways." The
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investigation should be extended and pressed forward, however, by persons working at a higher more disinterested level than can probably be
achieved within the CAA itself.
(4) If it is desired to put the industry on a self-sufficiency basis Section

406(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act should be revised in such a way as to
eliminate any Federal guarantee of the continued solvency of certificated
carriers.

The Civil Aeronautics Act presumes the operation of commercial
aviation by private companies under limited competition. In an economy based on private enterprise and initiative, it is a part of the function of competition in any market to eliminate so much of the supply as
cannot be made available at prices prevailing in that market. By this
means, the total number of suppliers at any one time is roughly proportional to that which the demand will support. The failure of certain
firms is quite as important in maintaining this balanced relationship as
the success of others.
There is undoubtedly a limited demand for air transportation at a
price sufficiently high to cover all costs of operation. If it is our policy
for commercial aviation to continue on a private enterprise basis then
the processes of competition should be permitted to operate in such a
way that the present excess in the facilities offered would be eliminated
by the failure of the weaker firms. If such a policy seems harsh it
should be remembered that it is no different from that which prevails
in nearly every other industry.
So long as Section 406 (b) stands in its present form, there is reason
to believe that capacity will always exceed demand, and that the Federal Government will always be obliged to cover the losses arising from
this fact. As one transportation expert phrased it some months ago,
"The competition we are subsidizing in the aviation industry -is competition for subsidies!"
If a policy other than competitive private enterprise were adopted
for our domestic air transport system, the guarantee afforded by Section
406 (b) would no longer be necessary.
(5) It is suggested that so long as there is no significant margin of profit
in the air transportation business, the policy of certifying competitive
carriers over the same routes should be discontinued.

On this point the industry's criticism of the Civil Aeronautics Board
appears to be sound. Granting that carriers have inaugurated more
schedules than they should have, as contended by the CAB, it seems
probable that they have done so, in part, in order to prevent loss of business to other carriers. The result, of course, has been lower load factors and heavier losses for all carriers concerned.
(6) If an official study similar to that attempted here, and the experience
of the next two or three years confirms the indications of this report that

commercial aviation on a large scale may be inherently unprofitable under
the present competitive private enterprise basis, it is suggested that consideration should be given to the following alternatives:
(a) The designation or organization of a single private carrier for

each route pattern, with a consolidation of all existing facilities un-
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der the control of that carrier; with the provision that that single

carrier would operate as a true public utility, under the close supervision of a Federal regulatory agency, and that the schedule of rates
for services to the public should be subject to review and approval by
such agency. (b) The nationalization of the air transport industry.

The first alternative is supported by the probability that a single
carrier, relieved of the necessity for meeting competition, could establish its schedules between the cities served on the basis of the total demand for such transportation, and could offer such capacity on each
schedule as would maximize its average load factor. It seems possible,
that on such a basis, a private carrier might cover all costs and earn a
fair return on its invested capital.
As to the second alternative, it may be pointed out that only in the
United States has air transportation on a large scale been undertaken
on a private enterprise, competitive basis. In every other country of
size or importance, air transport service is either provided directly by
the government, or the government holds a substantial and controlling
interest in companies in which there is some private participation. In
either case there is no attempt to establish competition among companies chartered or operated by the same national government.
Such an alternative would probably be more palatable here, in the
event it is decided that the aviation industry should be built and maintained on the basis of military necessity rather than on the basis of economic demand for air transportation.
The Policy Behind the Policies
In spite of the industry's criticism of its treatment at the hands of
the Federal Government, impartial observers would surely agree that
the civil aviation industry in the United States enjoys today a uniquely
favorable relationship with the Federal Government.
The scheduled air carrier industry has grown at a rapid rate during
the war and post-war years. A comparison of the capacity it is now
equipped to offer with the potential demand for air travel suggests that
opportunities for further growth in the near future are definitely limited. It can scarcely be regarded any longer as an "infant" industry.
Yet the carriers have found it necessary to ask for substantial increases in the rates at which they are paid for carrying the mail. Moreover, appropriations from the general revenues for the improvement
and operation of commercial air navigation facilities are steadily
increasing, with no prospect that any portion of these costs can ever be
recovered from the air line operators.
These facts suggest that the time is not far off, if it has not already
arrived, when the Federal Government should reappraise the premises
on which it has encouraged and sustained the development of commercial aviation, that the policy behind the policies should be revised, and
that some means should be sought whereby the operation of essential
air transportation services can be performed in a more equitable, more
economical way.

